United States v. Balter by unknown
1996 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
7-29-1996 
United States v. Balter 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_1996 
Recommended Citation 
"United States v. Balter" (1996). 1996 Decisions. 130. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_1996/130 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 1996 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
  
                 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
                     FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
                          ____________ 
                                 
                 Nos. 94-5593, 94-5625, 94-5626 
                          ____________ 
                                 
                    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
                                 
                               v. 
                                 
                         RICHARD BALTER 
                             Appellant No. 94-5593 
                                     
                                 
                    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
                                 
                               v. 
                                 
                         KENNETH CUTLER 
                            Appellant No. 94-5625 
                                     
                                 
                   UNITED STATES OF AMERICA  
                                 
                               v. 
                                 
                      CHRIS OSCAR DEJESUS 
                            Appellant No. 94-5626 
                      ____________________ 
                                 
        ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
                 FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY 
   (D.C. Criminal Nos. 93-00536-1, 93-00536-2 and 93-00536-4) 
                      ____________________ 
                                 
                     Argued: March 6, 1996 
      Before:  MANSMANN, ALITO, and LEWIS, Circuit Judges 
                                 
                 (Opinion Filed: July 29, 1996) 
                                 
                      ____________________ 
 
                   Faith S. Hochberg 
                   United States Attorney 
                   Kevin McNulty (Argued) 
                   Chief, Appeals Division 
                   Renee M. Bumb 
                   Assistant United States Attorney 
                   970 Broad Street 
                   Newark, New Jersey 07102 
 
                   Counsel for Appellee 
                    Paul B. Brickfield, P.C. (Argued) 
                   70 Grand Avenue 
                   River Edge, New Jersey 07661 
 
                   Richard E. Mischel, Esq. 
                   Kenneth Cutler, Esq. 
                   233 Broadway, Suite 3507 
                   New York, New York 10279 
 
                   Salvatore C. Adamo, Esq. 
                   412 Liggett Boulevard 
                   Phillipsburg, New Jersey 08865-4016 
                    
                   Counsel for Appellant 
 
                                            
 
                       OPINION OF THE COURT 
                                            
 
 
ALITO, Circuit Judge: 
         This case comes before us as a consolidated appeal from judgments 
of sentence 
imposed upon Richard Balter, Kenneth Cutler, and Chris Oscar DeJesus.  
After a joint trial, 
Balter, Cutler, and DeJesus were convicted for the murder-for-hire of 
Richard Cohen, in 
violation of 18 U.S.C.  1958 and 2, and Balter and Cutler were also 
convicted on related 
counts of mail fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C.  1341, 1342.  Although 
numerous 
allegations of error are raised, one issue -- whether New Jersey Rule of 
Professional Conduct 
4.2 which prohibits an attorney from contacting a represented party 
applies to federal 
prosecutors acting in the course of a pre-indictment investigation -- is a 
question of first 
impression for our court.  We affirm.   
 
                                I.      
         Richard Balter was the president and sole shareholder of 
Northeastern Poly 
Products, Inc. ("NPP") of Fairfield, New Jersey.  NPP sold and distributed 
plastic bag 
products.  Balter met Kenneth Cutler in the mid-1980's when Cutler was 
working for one of 
NPP's customers.  Balter and Cutler had an arrangement under which Balter 
paid cash 
kickbacks to Cutler in exchange for the purchase of NPP's products.  The 
cash for these 
kickbacks was generated by issuing checks to the fictitious payee "Robert 
Katz."  In 1992, 
Balter hired Cutler to work at NPP, and shortly after Cutler arrived, 
Balter and Cutler formed 
another plastic bag product company, International Syndication of America 
("ISA").   
         Robert Cohen owned and operated Uneeda Manufacturing Corporation 
("Uneeda") in the Bronx, New York.  Uneeda was an NPP customer that 
manufactured 
garbage cans and distributed plastic garbage bags.  Uneeda was NPP's most 
delinquent 
account.  By the early 1990's, Uneeda's outstanding balance had grown to 
approximately 
$600,000.     Balter initially tried to collect this debt by calling 
Cohen, and Cutler became 
involved with these collection efforts soon after joining NPP.  Cutler had 
known Cohen for 
many years prior to his involvement with Balter.  In fact, Cutler had been 
Cohen's best man at 
his wedding.  Trial tr. at 3393.  Cutler believed that NPP could not 
withstand the "financial 
blow" if Uneeda defaulted.  At one point, Cutler commented to an NPP 
employee that 
"something had to be done" and that "he was going [to] take care of the 
Uneeda problem."  
SA. 354. 
         Cohen began to worry that his business relationship with NPP had 
deteriorated 
to such a point that Balter would refuse to supply him with products.  
Fearing that this would 
thwart Uneeda's ability to make sales and generate income to pay its 
debts, Cohen discussed 
this problem with his long-time insurance agent, Jefferey Liederman, at 
New York Life 
Insurance Company ("New York Life").  Liederman suggested that Cohen take 
out a life 
insurance policy and that he name Balter as the beneficiary as a sign of 
good faith to convince 
Balter not to cut off Uneeda's product supply.  Cohen agreed. 
         Balter and Cutler were also Liederman's clients, and Liederman 
discussed the 
Uneeda account deficit with them over lunch on several occasions.  After 
Cohen agreed to take 
out the life insurance policy, Liederman reviewed with Balter the tax 
advantages that he would 
gain as the owner and beneficiary of that policy. 
         In February 1992, New York Life received an application for a 
$600,000 life 
insurance policy designating Cohen as the owner of the policy and his 
estate as the beneficiary.  
The application was accepted.  About a month later, New York Life received 
a change of 
beneficiary form changing the ownership of the policy to Richard Balter 
and designating 
"Richard Balter-Creditor" as the new beneficiary.  Balter paid the first 
month's premium on 
the policy and each monthly payment thereafter. 
         In September 1992, Cutler contacted Gustavo Gil, a former co-
worker.  Cutler 
and Gil had worked together at the Chrysler Corporation beginning in 1979, 
but they had not 
spoken in several years.  Cutler told Gil that he wanted to introduce him 
to a friend, but would 
not explain the reason for the introduction. 
         Gil met Cutler and Balter at a diner in Secaucus, New Jersey.  
After 
introductions, Balter told Gil that "there was a person who owed him a lot 
of money and who 
ha[d] insulted him and he wanted this man shot and killed."  SA. 21.  
Balter described the 
victim as a businessman in the Bronx, but he did not name him.  Balter 
asked Gil if he knew 
anyone who could do the killing, and Gil indicated that he did.  Balter 
explained that he was 
willing to pay "ten thousand dollars or more if necessary" for the murder.  
SA. 22.  Cutler 
instructed Gil to call them when he located someone to commit the murder.  
Balter and Cutler 
also offered to set Gil up in NPP's warehouse so that Gil could start his 
own business. 
         Over the course of the next month, Balter and Cutler pressed Gil 
to find 
someone to commit the murder.  NPP's bankers were threatening to withdraw 
NPP's line of 
credit due to concern about the Uneeda account.  Balter gave Gil an office 
in the NPP 
warehouse and other assistance to start his own business reconditioning 
automotive engines.  
During this period, Gil learned that Cohen was the intended victim.  On 
one occasion, he 
travelled with Balter's driver to Uneeda at Balter's behest.  Gil met 
Cohen at Uneeda and 
engaged him in conversation for approximately five minutes.   
         In December 1992, Gil contacted Manuel Garcia at a video store in 
Brooklyn, 
New York, to help him find someone to kill Cohen.  Garcia had worked for 
Gil in 1989, and 
Garcia had often talked about the people he knew in a gang called the 
"Tigres."  Garcia had 
told Gil that the "Tigres" were involved in drug sales, murders, and other 
violent crimes.  SA. 
13-14. 
         Gil told Garcia that the people he represented would pay $10,000 
to have Cohen 
killed.  Garcia expressed interest and said that he had "just the guy" to 
carry out the murder.  
SA. 51.  Garcia immediately introduced Gil to DeJesus.  DeJesus 
acknowledged that he had 
done this type of work in the past, but stated that he had not done it 
recently.  However, he 
admitted that he needed the money and therefore agreed to commit the 
murder.  DeJesus 
demanded half of the money in advance.  Gil then drove DeJesus to Uneeda 
and explained to 
him the details of the plan to kill Cohen. 
         Gil went to Balter that same day and informed him that DeJesus 
would do the 
job for $10,000, if half was paid up front.  Balter gave Gil $5,000 in 
cash that he had 
generated by writing checks for fictitious expenses.  Gil delivered the 
$5,000 to DeJesus the 
following day.   
         Meanwhile, Balter and Cutler were planning the details of the 
murder.  On 
January 8, 1993, they drove to Cohen's home near Peekskill, New York.  
They considered 
ambushing Cohen in his own neighborhood but concluded that Cohen's 
business in the Bronx 
would be a better location for the killing.  While Balter and Cutler were 
near Cohen's house, 
his housekeeper spotted them and became suspicious.  She told Cohen what 
she had seen and 
described Balter's car to him.  Cohen became concerned and contacted 
Liederman.  He told 
Liederman that he believed that Balter meant to harm him and indicated 
that he wanted Balter 
removed as the beneficiary of the insurance policy.  Liederman explained 
that Balter owned 
the policy and that Cohen therefore could no longer change the 
beneficiary.  
         Gil and DeJesus drove to Uneeda on the morning of January 19, 
1993.  Garcia 
was originally supposed to drive DeJesus, but the two had had a 
disagreement, and Gil had 
assented that morning to drive DeJesus to the murder scene.  Cohen arrived 
late for work.  By 
the time he arrived, the street was too busy to attempt the shooting.  Gil 
and DeJesus left 
Uneeda and went directly to Balter's office at NPP to tell him of the 
aborted attempt.  They 
agreed to try again the next morning.       Balter stressed to DeJesus 
that he wanted Cohen 
dead, not injured.  He told DeJesus to shoot Cohen in the head and to drop 
a bag of cocaine 
by the body to give the appearance of a drug-related killing.  DeJesus 
assured Balter that he 
knew what to do and that he had done this before.  Balter also told 
DeJesus that "if there are 
other people there when [Cohen's] there . . . shoot them all."  SA. 94.   
         Gil and DeJesus drove to Uneeda the next morning, January 20, 
1993.  When 
Cohen arrived, DeJesus engaged him in a short conversation and then shot 
him at least three 
times in the chest with a pistol.  An eyewitness to the shooting described 
the shooter as a light- 
skinned Hispanic man, between 21-27 years old, approximately 5'6," of 
medium build, with 
straight black bangs and a moustache.      
         After the murder, Gil and DeJesus drove back to NPP.  Balter gave 
DeJesus 
more money and told him that he would give him additional money "in a 
couple of months."  
SA. 111.  Cohen remained unconscious until he died on March 5, 1993.  
Balter and Cutler 
then submitted a claim form requesting payment on the life insurance 
policy. 
         In the meantime, federal law enforcement agents began 
investigating the 
murder.  Shortly after the investigation commenced, Gil admitted his role 
in the killing and 
secretly began cooperating with federal officers.  He surreptitiously 
recorded numerous live 
and telephone conversations with each of his co-conspirators.  The taped 
conversations include 
discussions about the murder, the cover-up, and payments made to DeJesus 
for committing the 
murder.  They largely corroborate Gil's extensive testimony identifying 
the different roles 
each of the defendants had in the murder scheme. 
         On November 9, 1993, a federal grand jury in the District of New 
Jersey 
returned an indictment against Balter, Cutler, DeJesus, and Garcia, and 
all of the defendants 
were arrested the following day.  DeJesus was arrested in Aberdeen, North 
Carolina.  After 
signing a written waiver-of-rights form and answering some brief 
biographical questions, he 
was given a copy of the indictment against him and was taken for an 
initial appearance.  He 
made no further statements until two days later when he called the 
arresting postal inspector in 
an attempt to make a deal. 
         The defendants were jointly tried in the United States District 
Court for the 
District of New Jersey beginning in late May 1994.  At the end of the 
government's case, the 
defendants moved for judgment of acquittal on all counts, and the 
government moved for the 
voluntary dismissal of three counts of mail fraud and aiding and abetting 
against Balter and 
Cutler.  The district court granted the government's motion and denied the 
defendants' motion 
to dismiss the remaining counts.   
         Balter presented no defense.  Cutler testified on his own behalf, 
but presented 
no other witnesses.  DeJesus presented one witness.  The jury found the 
defendants guilty of 
all the remaining counts on June 27, 1994.  The district court imposed  
sentences of life 
imprisonment on all of the defendants, and they then appealed. 
 
                               II. 
         On appeal, Balter argues that the district court erred by: (1) 
denying his 
repeated motions for a severance; (2) refusing to suppress his taped 
statements on the ground 
that they were made in violation of New Jersey Rule of Professional 
Conduct 4.2; and (3) 
admitting certain evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b).  Cutler 
appeals solely on 
the issue of severance.  DeJesus contends: (1) that the district court 
erred by improperly 
admitting Rule 404(b) evidence against him; (2) that the government 
impermissibly commented 
on his post-arrest silence in its summation in violation of Doyle v. Ohio, 
426 U.S. 610 (1975); 
(3) that the government improperly shifted the burden of proof to him 
during its summation; 
(4) that the government retreated from its theory of the case during its 
closing and created a 
variance from the indictment; (5) that the district court erroneously 
admitted his high school 
yearbook photograph; and (6) that the cumulative effect of these alleged 
errors requires the 
reversal of his conviction.  We will address each of these arguments 
seriatim. 
 
                               III. 
         A.  Balter and Cutler claim that they had "mutually antagonistic 
defenses" at 
trial and that the district court therefore erred in failing to grant 
their repeated motions for a 
severance.  We reject this argument.   
         As the Supreme Court observed in United States v. Zafiro, 506 
U.S. 534, 537 
(1993) (quoting Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 209 (1987)), "[t]here 
is a preference in 
the federal system for joint trials of defendants who are indicted 
together," because joint trials 
"promote efficiency and `serve the interests of justice by avoiding the 
scandal and inequity of 
inconsistent verdicts.'"  In Zafiro, as in this case, the defendants 
argued that they had been 
prejudiced because they had "mutually antagonistic" or "irreconcilable" 
defenses, and they  
urged the Court to adopt "a bright-line rule, mandating severance whenever 
codefendants have 
conflicting defenses."   Id. at 538.  The Court, however, explicitly 
declined to adopt such a 
rule.  Id. at 538.  Rather, the Court instructed that trial courts should 
grant a severance under 
Fed. R. Crim. P. 14 "only if there is a serious risk that a joint trial 
would compromise a 
specific trial right of one of the defendants, or prevent the jury from 
making a reliable 
judgment about guilt or innocence."  Zafiro, 506 U.S. at 538-39.  "Such a 
risk might occur," 
the Court observed, "when evidence that the jury should not consider 
against a defendant and 
that would not be admissible if a defendant were tried alone is admitted 
against a 
codefendant."  Id. at 539.  The Court cited three specific examples in 
which this might take 
place:  (1) "a complex case" involving "many defendants" with "markedly 
different degrees of 
culpability," (2) a case such as Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 
(1968), where evidence 
that is probative of one defendant's guilt is technically admissible only 
against a co-defendant, 
and (3) a case where evidence that exculpates one defendant is unavailable 
in a joint trial.  
Zafiro, 506 U.S. at 539.   
          Since Zafiro, claims based on mutually antagonistic defenses 
have usually been 
found insufficient to warrant severance without a strong showing that such 
specific rights were 
impaired.  See, e.g., United States v. Voight, ___ F.3d ___, ___ (3d Cir. 
1996);  United 
States v. Frost, 61 F.3d 1518, 1526 (11th Cir. 1995); United States v. 
Quintero, 38 F.3d 
1317, 1341-42 (3d Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 1263 (1995); United 
States v. Linn, 31 
F.3d 987, 992 (10th Cir. 1994); United States v. Dimas, 3 F.3d 1015, 1020 
(7th Cir. 1993).  
            
         A denial of a motion for severance may be reversed only if the 
district court 
abused its discretion.  Zafiro, 506 U.S. at 541; United States v. 
Thornton, 1 F.3d 149, 152 
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S.Ct 483 (1993).  Defendants seeking to 
overturn a district court's 
discretionary decision to deny a motion for severance "must demonstrate 
clear and substantial 
prejudice resulting in a manifestly unfair trial."  United States v. 
Voight, ___ F.3d at ___; 
United States v. Eufrasio, 935 F.2d 553, 568 (3d Cir. 1991), cert. denied 
502 U.S. 925 
(1991).  "`Prejudice should not be found in a joint trial just because all 
evidence adduced is 
not germane to all counts against each defendant' or some evidence adduced 
is `more 
damaging to one defendant than others.'"  United States v. Console, 13 
F.3d 641, 655 (3d Cir. 
1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1660 (1994) (citing Eufrasio, 935 F.2d at 
568). 
         In this case, although Balter and Cutler maintain that they had 
mutually 
antagonistic defenses at trial, they have not identified any specific 
trial rights that were 
compromised by the joint trial; nor have they demonstrated that the joint 
trial impeded the jury 
from making a reliable judgment about guilt or innocence.  Accordingly, we 
find no abuse of 
discretion on the part of the trial judge in denying their severance 
requests. 
 
         B.  Balter claimed complete innocence and alleged that Cutler, 
Gil, Garcia, and 
DeJesus murdered Cohen and then sought to extort Balter by threatening to 
frame him with the 
murder.  Balter alleges generally that the joint trial was unreliable and 
that he was "repeatedly 
denied the opportunity to present his defense and adequately cross-examine 
witnesses testifying 
against him."  Balter Br. at 15.  Balter's most specific allegations of 
prejudice are (a) that he 
was denied the right to cross-examine Gil "on numerous occasions" and (b) 
that the court 
refused to admit evidence that he proffered to show that he had sought to 
disassociate himself 
from DeJesus and to show that Garcia had a history of murder and other 
violent conduct.  This 
latter evidence, Balter argues, would have supported his defense that he 
succumbed to the 
others' extortion after the murder because he feared Garcia.  
         Balter's arguments are inconsistent with the record.  Although he 
claims that his 
attorney was unduly restricted in his cross-examination of Gil, this 
cross-examination was 
detailed and extensive,  JA. 491-869, and Balter has not cited any 
specific information that 
would have been helpful to his defense and that he was not permitted to 
elicit from Gil.  Nor 
has he cited any evidence that was admitted against him that would have 
been inadmissible had 
he been tried separately.   
         Furthermore, neither of the two rather routine evidentiary 
rulings of which 
Balter complains resulted in prejudice that approached a level that would 
have warranted a 
severance.  First, Balter sought to introduce a portion of transcript 
containing his statement 
that he did not want to be associated with DeJesus because DeJesus had a 
criminal record.  
Balter wanted to introduce this portion of the transcript to corroborate 
his claim that he feared 
DeJesus.  However, DeJesus, although he might have been involved in past 
criminal conduct, 
did not have a criminal record.  Consequently, the court permitted Balter 
to introduce a 
redacted version of the transcript that included Balter's statement that 
he did not wish to be 
associated with anyone but that omitted the portion of the statement 
reflecting Balter's 
erroneous belief that DeJesus had a criminal record.  SA. 243.  The court 
further ruled that 
Balter's attorney, in cross-examining Gil, could ask him if he had told 
Balter that DeJesus had 
a criminal record but that if Balter's attorney asked this question the 
court would instruct the 
jury that DeJesus did not have a record.  Balter's attorney then elected 
not to pursue this 
matter in cross-examining Gil.  The district court's handling of this 
issue was fair and sensitive 
to the needs of Balter's defense, and the likelihood that the redaction of 
the transcript had any 
detrimental effect on Balter seems quite low.  
         Second, Balter challenges the district court's exclusion of Gil's 
proposed 
testimony that Garcia had told him that he had recently committed another 
murder in order to 
convince Gil that he was qualified for the present job.  The court ruled 
that the prejudicial 
effect of this statement on co-defendant Garcia outweighed the probative 
value for Balter to 
establish fear.  Nevertheless, the court permitted Balter to elicit 
testimony about Garcia's 
involvement with a violent drug gang that was involved in "[d]rug sales, 
violent acts, [and] 
murder."  JA. 1310-11.  This was adequate to support Balter's claim of 
fear.   
         We conclude that Balter cannot show prejudice from the joint 
trial and that the 
district court did not abuse its discretion in denying his motions for a 
severance. 
 
         C.  Cutler maintained that he did not participate in the murder 
and merely 
helped to cover up Balter's involvement after the fact.  Cutler argues 
that the trial court's 
failure to grant his severance motions prejudiced him by creating the 
incentive for Balter's 
counsel to become a "second prosecutor."  There are pre-Zafiro cases that 
advanced the 
"second prosecutor" theory as a ground for requiring severance.  See 
United States v. Tootick, 
952 F.2d 1078, 1082 (9th Cir. 1991); United States v. Romanello, 726 F.2d 
173, 179 (5th 
Cir. 1984).  Justice Stevens also noted it as a potential problem in his 
concurrence in Zafiro.  
Id. 506 U.S. at 544.  Cutler, however, cites no post-Zafiro cases 
reversing a trial judge's 
denial of a severance on the basis of this theory, and we are not aware of 
any such cases.  In 
fact, Cutler concedes that Tootick, one of the leading cases embracing 
this theory and one of 
the cases on which he relies most heavily, was subsequently limited to its 
facts by the Ninth 
Circuit after Zafiro.  United States v. Buena-Lopez,987 F.2d 657, 660-61 
(9th Cir. 1993).  
The court observed in Buena-Lopez that the relevant inquiry after Zafiro 
focuses on specific 
and significant prejudice to the defendant, not on a more general "second 
prosecutor" theory.  
Id. 
         Cutler's only specific claim of prejudice is that the district 
court refused to 
permit him to introduce hundreds of checks made out to the fictitious 
payee "Robert Katz."  
After the government introduced five such checks in order to show the 
method by which Balter 
generated cash to pay for the murder,  Cutler sought to introduce all of 
the "Robert Katz" 
checks to show that Balter had used such checks to pay Cutler for other 
services and that 
therefore that the five checks introduced by the government were not 
necessarily related to the 
murder.  The court excluded the hundreds of checks that Cutler sought to 
introduce because 
the court thought that they would confuse the jury, but the court allowed 
another witness to 
testify about all of the checks.  JA. 1071.  Indeed, Cutler agreed on the 
record to this 
approach.  Id.   
         In view of Cutler's acceptance of this approach, we would not 
find that the 
district court erred even if Cutler could show that he was prejudiced by 
not being permitted to 
introduce the actual checks.  See United States v. Olano, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 
1777 (1993).  But in 
any event, Cutler has not shown that he suffered prejudice.  We therefore 
hold that the district 
court did not abuse its discretion in denying his motions for a severance.    
                               IV. 
              Balter also contends that the district court erroneously 
admitted taped 
telephone conversations between himself and Gil.  Balter argues that these 
tapes were made in 
violation of New Jersey Rule of Professional Conduct 4.2, which prohibits 
a lawyer from 
contacting a represented party.  Balter maintains that, even before he was 
indicted, Rule 4.2 
prohibited the government from using Gil as its agent to contact him 
because he had already 
retained counsel.  According to Balter, the required remedy for these 
alleged violations of 
Rule 4.2 is the suppression of these statements.   
         Local Rule 6(A) of the United States District Court for the 
District of New 
Jersey provides that the Rules of Professional Conduct of the American Bar 
Association as 
revised by the New Jersey Supreme Court shall apply to attorneys 
practicing before the 
District Court, "subject to such modifications as may be required or 
permitted by federal 
statute, regulation, court rule or decision of law."  D.N.J.R. 6(A).  Rule 
4.2 of the New 
Jersey Rules of Professional Conduct ("Rule 4.2" or "the Rule") provides: 
         In representing a client, a lawyer shall not communicate about 
the 
         subject of the representation with a party the lawyer knows to be 
         represented by another lawyer in the matter, unless authorized by 
         law to do so.  
N.J.R.P.C. 4.2.  The New Jersey Supreme Court has not considered  the 
applicability of this 
Rule to prosecutors acting in the course of a pre-indictment 
investigation.  "Where there is no 
definitive state court decision interpreting the rules as promulgated by 
the [New Jersey] 
Supreme Court, the federal Court will proceed to reach its own conclusion 
as to the 
appropriate application of the Rules of Professional Conduct."  D.N.J.R. 
6, Comment.  In this 
case, the district court rejected Balter's argument on the theory that 
federal prosecutors are 
"authorized by law" to conduct pre-indictment investigations and that 
contact with a 
represented party in the course of such an investigation if therefore 
permitted under Rule 4.2.    
         Whether Rule 4.2 applies to government attorneys who communicate 
with a 
suspect as part of a pre-indictment criminal investigation is a question 
of first impression for 
this court, but we have no doubt that the district court's decision was 
correct.  The language 
of Rule 4.2 and the opinions of the Appellate Division of the New Jersey 
Superior Court 
construing that rule support the view that the Rule is inapplicable to 
cases such as the one 
before us.  Moreover, the overwhelming majority of circuits to have 
addressed this issue have 
also concluded that Model Rule of Professional Conduct 4.2, upon which New 
Jersey Rule 4.2 
is based, is not applicable in such circumstances. 
         By its terms, Rule 4.2 applies to a "party" represented in a 
"matter."  A "party" 
is necessarily a "party" to something.  The Appellate Division of the New 
Jersey Superior 
Court has held that a criminal suspect is not a "party" until "after 
formal legal or adversarial 
proceedings are commenced."  State of New Jersey v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 589 
A.2d 180, 183 
(App. Div. 1991), appeal dismissed, 617 A.2d 1213 (N.J. 1992).  The court 
in Ciba-Geigyexplained that in the criminal context adversarial 
proceedings commence "by complaint or 
indictment after investigation."  Id. at 185 (emphasis added).  We agree. 
         Moreover, even if a criminal suspect were a "party" within the 
meaning of the 
Rule, pre-indictment investigation by prosecutors is precisely the type of 
contact exempted 
from the Rule as "authorized by law."  New Jersey case law has explicitly 
exempted ordinary 
pre-indictment investigation as within the "authorized by law" exception 
to the Rule.  State v. 
Porter, 510 A.2d 49, 54 (App. Div. 1986).  Prohibiting prosecutors from 
investigating an 
unindicted suspect who has retained counsel would serve only to insulate 
certain classes of 
suspects from ordinary pre-indictment investigation.  Furthermore, such a 
rule would 
significantly hamper legitimate law enforcement operations by making it 
very difficult to 
investigate certain individuals.  Thus, even assuming that Gil contacted 
Balter at the direction 
and under the supervision of government attorneys, the conduct of these 
attorneys was clearly 
in the course of a legitimate pre-indictment investigation and was 
therefore "authorized by 
law" under New Jersey Rule 4.2. 
         This conclusion is supported by the decisions of many other 
courts of appeals.  
Indeed, with the exception of the Second Circuit, every court of appeals 
that has considered a 
similar case has held, for substantially the same reasons as those noted 
above, that rules such 
as New Jersey Rule 4.2 do not apply to pre-indictment criminal 
investigations by government 
attorneys.  See, e.g., United States v. Powe, 9 F.3d 68 (9th Cir. 1993); 
United States v. 
Ryans, 903 F.2d 731 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 855 (1990); United 
States v. Sutton, 
801 F.2d 1346 (D.C. Cir. 1986); United States v. Dobbs, 711 F.2d 84 (8th 
Cir. 1983); United 
States v. Weiss, 599 F.2d 730 (5th Cir. 1979);  But see United States v. 
Hammad, 858 F.2d 
834 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 871 (1990).  And even the 
Second Circuit has held 
that ordinary pre-indictment investigation, such as that involved in this 
case, falls within the 
"authorized by law" exception to the Rule absent some independent 
misconduct by the 
prosecutors.  Hammad, 858 F.2d at 840.     
         We hold that New Jersey Rule 4.2 is inapplicable to contacts made 
by 
prosecutors or their agents with criminal suspects in the course of a pre-
indictment 
investigation.  The district court therefore did not abuse its discretion 
in refusing to suppress 
the taped statements at issue here. 
 
                                V. 
         A.  Balter and DeJesus also contend that the district court 
violated Federal Rule 
of Evidence 404(b) by admitting certain of their statements that show, in 
their view, nothing 
more than a propensity to commit crimes.  Trial court rulings under Rule 
404(b) are reviewed 
for an abuse of discretion and may be reversed only when they are "clearly 
contrary to reason 
and not justified by the evidence."  United States v. Bethancourt, 65 F.3d 
1074, 1079 (3d Cir. 
1995), cert. denied, 116 S.Ct. 1032 (1996) (citation omitted).  This 
stringent standard has not 
been met here. 
 
         B.  Balter objects to the admission of a statement that he made 
to Gil in a taped 
conversation that took place after the murder.  After Gil mentioned to 
Balter that DeJesus 
wanted more money, Balter responded that if DeJesus "just disappears, then 
we'll have no f---- 
-- problems."  Balter added, however, that "then we'll be involved with 
someone else again."  
SA. 234.      Balter asserts that there was no proper basis for admitting 
this statement under 
Rule 404(b) and that it was admitted merely to show criminal propensity.  
He maintains that 
the statement has "no probative value," Balter Br. at 30 (emphasis in 
original), and is highly 
prejudicial.  We disagree.  
         Under Rule 404(b), evidence of "other crimes, wrongs, or acts" 
may be 
admissible to show, among other things, "preparation, plan, and 
knowledge."   The statement 
in question here is clearly relevant to show Balter's knowledge of the 
original plan and his 
involvement in the plan to cover up the murder.  It casts significant 
doubt on his defense that 
he had nothing to do with the planning of the murder but was merely 
extorted to make 
payments after the fact by the other parties.  Consequently, the district 
court's admission of 
this statement did not violate Rule 404(b).   
         C.  DeJesus objects to the admission of testimony that he had 
boasted of 
previous experience as a murderer for hire.  Gil was questioned about the 
conversation he had 
with DeJesus when he first asked DeJesus if he would be interested in 
committing the murder 
for payment, and Gil testified that DeJesus acknowledged that he was 
interested.  Gil added 
that DeJesus had  "told [him] that he had done this type of thing before, 
. . . that he had not 
been doing it, but would do it because he needed the money," and "that he 
knew what he had 
to do, he had done it before and he knew what he had to do to kill [the 
victim]."  SA. 81, 99. 
         DeJesus asserts that these statements had no probative value and 
were highly 
prejudicial.  Again, however, we see no basis for reversing the trial 
judge's ruling.  DeJesus's 
defense was that he was present at the murder scene but that he did not 
commit the murder.  
These statements were relevant to show, among other things, that he had a 
financial motive to 
commit the murder and the intent to do so.  They also show preparation.  
DeJesus was trying 
to sell himself to Gil as a seasoned professional.  His motive for getting 
involved and his intent 
in going to the scene are central to the charge of traveling interstate 
with the intent to commit 
murder for hire.  Thus, the district court had a sound basis for 
concluding that these 
statements were admissible under Rule 404(b).   
 
                               VI. 
         DeJesus contends that one of the prosecutors violated the rule of 
Doyle v. Ohio, 
426 U.S. 610 (1976), during her summation by commenting on his post-arrest 
silence for the 
purpose of impeaching a subsequent exculpatory statement.  We are troubled 
by the 
prosecutor's comments, but we are convinced that even if they were 
improper they constituted 
harmless error.    
         A.  DeJesus was arrested in Aberdeen, North Carolina, by Postal 
Inspector 
William Johnson.  Upon his arrest, DeJesus was read his Miranda rights, 
and he signed a 
written waiver of those rights.  He then disclosed information about his 
identity and personal 
history, but he did not comment on the offenses for which he had been 
arrested.  JA. 1455-57.  
He was taken to court in Winston-Salem for his initial appearance.  JA. 
1459-60.  Upon 
arrival, he was given a copy of his indictment.  After having the 
opportunity to read the 
indictment for approximately 25 minutes,  DeJesus was brought before a 
magistrate judge.  
Although the record of the initial appearance has not been made a part of 
the record of this 
case, the district court and the parties have all proceeded on the 
assumption that the initial 
appearance was conducted in conformity with Rule 5(c) of the Federal Rules 
of Criminal 
Procedure and that the magistrate judge therefore informed DeJesus that he 
was "not required 
to make a statement and that any statement made by [him could] be used 
against [him]."  Fed. 
R. Crim. P. 5(c).  See JA. 1575. 
         After the initial appearance, DeJesus was incarcerated, and two 
days later, he 
telephoned Inspector Johnson and tried to make a deal.  JA. 1461.  DeJesus 
said that he was 
afraid of Gil.  He admitted that he drove with Gil to the homicide, but he 
maintained that Gil 
had actually done the shooting.  He explained that he had testified in 
other similar cases and 
offered to help in any way he could.  JA. 1462. 
         DeJesus complains specifically of two comments that the 
prosecutor made in 
summation.  The prosecutor remarked: 
         If DeJesus is totally innocent and in his mind all he did was he 
         drove there and he was totally innocent, okay, then why didn't he 
         as he's reading the indictment pop up and say wait a minute, wait 
         a minute, they're saying I was the hit man here, I wasn't the hit 
         man here, I just drove there.  And if in his own mind he's 
totally 
         innocent and he just drove there then why doesn't he just pop 
         right up and say whoa, he knew what it meant to talk?  But he 
         waits two days, he waits two days to concocted [sic] his story. . 
. 
         . He's trying to cut himself a break because he thinks that the 
         Government doesn't know about Gus Gil because his name's not 
         in [the indictment].  So he's saying to himself, he's sitting 
there 
         pondering for two days well, I'll tell them, I'll blame it on Gus 
         Gil,and I'll tell them I just drove then as the Government 
         probably doesn't know about Gus Gil so let me, let me tell him 
         and I'll cut myself a break. 
 
JA 1543-44.  The prosecutor also commented: "If [DeJesus] just drove and 
he's totally 
innocent, then why didn't he tell Inspector Johnson immediately?  Why wait 
two days?"  JA. 
1557. 
         DeJesus's counsel immediately moved for a mistrial based on these 
comments.  
The court denied this motion but gave a limiting instruction that 
admonished the jury not to 
consider the portion of the prosecutor's argument that focused on 
DeJesus's silence at his 
preliminary hearing.  Nonetheless, the court explained that the jury could 
consider the  
chronology of events, so long as it did not consider DeJesus's silence.  
At the conclusion of 
the trial, DeJesus's counsel made a second motion for a mistrial, but this 
motion was also 
denied. 
 
         B.  In Doyle v. Ohio, supra, the Supreme Court held that "the use 
for 
impeachment purposes of [a defendant's] silence, at the time of arrest and 
after receiving 
Miranda warnings, violate[s] the Due Process Clause."   The Court 
reasoned: 
         The warnings mandated by [Miranda], as a prophylactic means of 
         safeguarding Fifth Amendment rights, . . .   require that a 
         person taken into custody be advised    immediately that he 
         has the right to remain silent, that anything he says may be used 
         against him, and that he has a right to retained or appointed 
         counsel before      submitting to interrogation.  Silence in the 
         wake of these warnings may be nothing more than the arrestee's 
         exercise of these Miranda rights.  Thus, every post-arrest 
silence 
         is insolubly ambiguous because of what the State is required to 
         advise the person arrested. . . .  Moreover, while it is true 
that 
         the Miranda warnings contain no express assurance that silence 
         will carry no penalty, such assurance is implicit to any person 
         who receives the warnings.  In such circumstances, it would be 
         fundamentally unfair and a deprivation of due process to allow 
         the arrested person's silence to be used to impeach an 
explanation 
         subsequently offered at trial. 
 
426 U.S. at 617-18 (citations and footnote omitted).  
         In attempting to defend the prosecutor's comments, the government 
points out 
that the present case differs from Doyle in that Doyle concerned a 
defendant's silence 
immediately after the administration of Miranda warnings whereas this case 
concerns 
DeJesus's silence during the two days following the (presumed) 
administration of warnings at 
his initial appearance.  The government then notes that the Supreme Court 
has repeatedly 
declined to extend the rule of Doyle beyond its original scope.  See 
Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 
U.S. 231 (1979) (pre-arrest silence may be used to impeach exculpatory 
testimony at trial); 
Anderson v. Charles, 447 U.S. 404 (1979) (inconsistent statement given 
after arrest and 
Miranda warnings may be used to impeach exculpatory trial testimony); 
Fletcher v. Weir, 455 
U.S. 603 (1981) (post-arrest silence may be used to impeach exculpatory 
testimony at trial 
where no Miranda warnings were ever given).  Furthermore, the Court has 
held that there is 
no Doyle violation where the trial court gives a curative instruction 
informing the jury that the 
defendant's post-arrest silence is not evidence and cannot be used to 
infer guilt.  Greer v. 
Miller, 483 U.S. 756 (1986). 
         We are not convinced that the government's suggested distinction 
is valid.  It 
may be that a defendant's silence immediately after receiving Miranda 
warnings is more likely 
to represent the exercise of Miranda rights than is a defendant's silence 
for an extended period 
after the receipt of warnings, but the amount of time that elapsed in this 
case between the 
(presumed) administration of warnings at the initial appearance and the 
defendant's telephone 
call to Inspector Johnson -- two days -- was not great.  A defendant might 
well remain silent 
for such a period in reliance on the belief, engendered by the warnings, 
that his silence could 
not in any way be used against him. 
         The government also argues that this case is distinguishable from 
Doyle because 
the prosecutor commented, not on DeJesus's silence, but on the timing of 
his call to Inspector 
Johnson.  The government insists that the prosecutor merely noted that 
DeJesus had a two-day 
opportunity to construct an alibi based on the indictment he had read.  
However, we question 
whether this argument can be distinguished from an argument that was 
expressly rejected in 
Doyle.  There, the prosecution maintained that "the discrepancy between an 
exculpatory story 
at trial and silence at the time of arrest gives rise to an inference that 
the story was fabricated 
somewhere along the way, perhaps to fit within the seams of the state's 
case as it was 
developed[.]"  Doyle 426 U.S. at 616.  But the Court refused to accept 
that argument.  Id. at 
617-18.   
 
         C.  While we are doubtful that the present case can be 
distinguished from 
Doyle, we find it unnecessary to decide this question, with respect to 
which there is apparently 
no precedent that is directly on point.  Assuming that the prosecutor's 
imprudent comments 
violated DeJesus's rights under Doyle, and assuming that they were not 
cured by the district 
court's limiting instruction, any error was harmless beyond a reasonable 
doubt in light of the 
overwhelming evidence admitted against DeJesus at trial.   
         The Supreme Court has held that "Doyle error fits squarely into 
the category of 
constitutional violations which [it] ha[s] characterized as `trial 
error.'"  Brecht v. 
Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 629 (1993)(quoting Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 
U.S. 279, 307 
(1991)).  Such constitutional errors are subject to harmless error 
analysis under the "harmless- 
beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard."  Brecht, 507 U.S. at 630 (citing 
Chapman v. California, 
386 U.S. 18 (1967)).  Moreover, this court has previously recognized that 
Doyle violations are 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt where the evidence against the 
defendant is 
"overwhelming." United States v. Dunbar, 767 F.2d 72, 76 (1985).   
         The evidence against DeJesus in this case, like the evidence 
against the 
defendant in Dunbar, was "overwhelming."  DeJesus was charged with 
knowingly and 
willfully travelling in interstate commerce and using and causing another 
to use a facility in 
interstate commerce with intent that a murder be committed.  JA 78, 84.  
He admitted that he 
drove with Gil to Uneeda on the morning that Cohen was murdered.  JA. 419, 
1585.  
Therefore, the only remaining element the prosecution needed to prove was 
the requisite 
intent, and the evidence of this intent was enormous.       
         There was abundant evidence that DeJesus agreed to participate in 
the murder 
prior to its commission and that he took part in the planning and the 
prior unsuccessful attempt 
to kill Cohen.  Gil testified to every aspect of DeJesus's involvement.  
He explained that 
Garcia had introduced them and that Gil had explained the job to DeJesus.  
Gil testified that 
DeJesus was immediately interested because he said that he needed the 
money. SA. 81.  Gil 
recounted that he and DeJesus drove from that initial meeting to Uneeda so 
that he could show 
DeJesus where and how the murder was to take place.  SA. 59-62.  Gil 
described the failed 
attempt to kill Cohen at Uneeda on January 19, 1993, and the subsequent 
meeting with 
DeJesus and Balter at NPP where Balter told DeJesus that he wanted to make 
sure Cohen was 
dead and that it should look like a drug-related killing.  SA. 85-96.  
Portions of taped 
conversations among Gil, Balter, Cutler, Garcia, and DeJesus corroborated 
much of Gil's 
testimony.  See e.g., SA. 232 (DeJesus "did this for [Balter] and now 
[Balter's] turning his 
back on me"); SA. 269 (Garcia found DeJesus for Gil); Id. (DeJesus "did 
it"); SA. 282-83 
(DeJesus was looking for more money and had given some to Garcia "after 
the job"); SA. 234 
(Gil had brought DeJesus to NPP).  It is also noteworthy that the 
prosecutor's challenged 
comments did not focus directly on the question whether DeJesus had the 
"intent that a murder 
be committed," as required by 18 U.S.C.  1958, but rather on the question 
whether DeJesus 
was the person who actually did the shooting, an element that was not 
required for conviction 
under that provision.            
         In light of overwhelming evidence that DeJesus travelled in 
interstate commerce 
with the intent that the murder of Cohen be committed, we hold that if the 
prosecutor's 
comments violated the rule of Doyle v. Ohio, supra, the error was harmless 
beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  
 
                               VII. 
         DeJesus argues that the government improperly shifted the burden 
of proof in 
its closing argument by commenting on defense counsel's failure to explain 
why DeJesus was 
at the scene of the crime at all if he was not the person who actually did 
the shooting.  The 
prosecutor stated: "Now what Mr. Brickfield [counsel for DeJesus] never 
tells you and he is 
the master of the uncompleted thought here.  What he never tells you is 
why he was there.  
What was he doing there[?]"  JA 1645.  If this issue had been preserved, 
DeJesus would have 
to show that any error affected the jury's ability to judge the evidence 
fairly.  United States v. 
Young, 470 U.S. 1, 12 (1985).  However, DeJesus's attorney did not object 
to this comment 
at trial, and therefore DeJesus must show that the trial judge committed 
plain error in failing 
to strike this comment sua sponte.  We find no plain error.   
         DeJesus correctly points out that the prosecution may not comment 
on a 
defendant's failure to testify or to produce evidence.  See United States 
v. Drake, 885 F.2d 
323 (6th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, sub nom. Clark v. United States, 495 
U.S. 1033, and cert. 
denied, 493 U.S. 1049 (1990).  But the prosecutor did not do that; he 
commented on the 
failure of DeJesus's attorney to point to any evidence in the record 
supporting his theory of 
what occurred.  Such a comment does not implicate any of the burden-
shifting concerns that 
are raised when a prosecutor points to a defendant's failure to testify or 
to produce evidence 
tending to show his innocence.  See United States v. Gotchis, 803 F.2d 74, 
81 (2d Cir. 1986) 
(noting without reaching the issue that a court "would place especially 
undesirable constraints 
on the government by precluding . . . comments [on the absence of evidence 
to rebut its case] 
where defense counsel himself has suggested the alternative theory that 
the prosecutor then 
undertakes to debunk"). 
          The prosecutor's comment attempted to focus the jury's attention 
on holes in 
the defense's theory.  Permitting this comment did not constitute plain 
error. 
 
                              VIII. 
         DeJesus argues that the government retreated from the theory 
contained in the 
indictment, i.e., that DeJesus was the person who actually did the 
shooting, and thereby 
created a prejudicial variance.  According to DeJesus, this occurred when 
the prosecutor 
stated, in rebuttal summation, that "whether or not he [DeJesus] was the 
shooter is not an issue 
here."  JA 1646.  DeJesus argues that he was substantially prejudiced 
because the timing of 
this alleged change in the government's strategy -- after the close of 
evidence and just before 
the case was given to the jury -- made it impossible for him to mold his 
defense strategy 
properly.   
         To prevail on this issue, DeJesus must show (1) that there was a 
variance 
between the indictment and the proof adduced at trial and (2) that the 
variance prejudiced some 
substantial right.  United States v. Adams, 759 F.2d 1099, 1109 (3d Cir.), 
cert. denied, sub 
nom. Mustacchio v. United States, 474 U.S. 906, and cert. denied, sub nom. 
Alongi v. United 
States, 474 U.S. 906, and cert. denied, 474 U.S 971 (1985).  A variance 
occurs when "the 
charging terms are unchanged, but the evidence at trial proves facts 
materially different from 
those alleged in the indictment."  United States v. Castro, 776 F.2d 1118, 
1121 (3d Cir.), 
cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1029 (1985).  To show prejudice, a defendant must 
generally show that 
the indictment either did not sufficiently inform him of the charges 
against him so that he 
could prepare his defense and not be misled or surprised at trial or that 
the variance created a 
danger that the defendant could be prosecuted a second time for the same 
offense.  Id. at 1123. 
         We are convinced that there was no prejudicial variance in this 
case.  In order 
to show that DeJesus committed the violation of 18 U.S.C.  1958 and 2 
that was charged in 
count I of the superseding indictment, the government was not obligated to 
show that DeJesus 
actually did the shooting, and accordingly the charging paragraph of this 
count did not tie the 
prosecution to this theory.  Instead, it merely alleged that DeJesus -- 
and the other defendants - 
- "knowingly and willfully travelled in and caused another to travel in 
interstate commerce and 
used and caused another to use a facility in interstate commerce with 
intent that a murder be 
committed."  J.A. 84.  Although a later paragraph of this count did allege 
that "DeJesus 
attempted to kill Robert cohen by shooting him several times with a 
pistol," J.A. 88, DeJesus 
and his attorney undoubtedly understood that the charge set out in count I 
did not require proof 
that DeJesus did the shooting, and thus we see no basis for concluding 
that the alleged switch 
in the government's theory caused them to be surprised, misled, or 
prejudiced in the 
preparation of DeJesus's defense. 
         In any event, the record does not support DeJesus's argument that 
the 
prosecution abandoned its theory that DeJesus did the shooting.  Instead, 
the prosecutor's 
statement was merely a correction of defense counsel's misstatement of the 
law, i.e., that "the 
only issue with respect to [DeJesus] was he was the shooter as charged?  
Was he the shooter as 
Gus Gil has testified[?]"  JA 1613.  The prosecutor responded by stating: 
         The point being whether or not he was the shooter, we don't 
concede for a 
         minute that DeJesus was not the shooter, whether or not he was 
the shooter is 
         not an issue here, the issue is did he travel in interstate 
commerce with the 
         intent that a murder be committed? 
 
JA 1646.  Although the district court found this to be a "fair response" 
to defense counsel's 
misstatement of the law, the court allowed defense counsel an extra two 
minutes to address the 
jury.  In surrebuttal, the government restated its contention that the 
evidence was sufficient to 
prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that DeJesus was the shooter.  JA 1658-
59.  Under these 
circumstances, any variance between the facts alleged in the superseding 
indictment and those 
proved at trial was not prejudicial to DeJesus. 
 
                               IX. 
         DeJesus contends that the district court should have excluded a 
high school 
yearbook photograph of him under Federal Rule of Evidence 403.  A district 
court has broad 
discretion to determine the admissibility of relevant evidence in response 
to an objection under 
Rule 403.  United States v. Pelullo, 14 F.3d 881, 888 (3d Cir. 1994).  "If 
judicial restraint is 
ever desirable, it is when a Rule 403 analysis of a trial court is 
reviewed by an appellate 
tribunal."  United States v. Scarfo, 850 F.2d 1015, 1019 (3d Cir.), cert. 
denied, 488 U.S. 910 
(1988). 
         The prosecution offered the yearbook photo to corroborate the 
testimony of an 
eyewitness, Lisa Allen, who described the shooter as having straight black 
bangs and a 
moustache.  When he was arrested, DeJesus had a moustache, but at the time 
of trial, he had 
neither a moustache nor straight black bangs.  In the yearbook photo, 
which had been taken 
six years earlier when DeJesus was 16, he had both straight black bangs 
and a moustache.   
         DeJesus suggests that the photograph had little probative value 
for the purpose 
of establishing his appearance at the time of the shooting, six years 
after the picture was taken,  
and he argues that the photo created an undue danger of unfair prejudice 
because it was old 
and depicted him when he was "a mere adolescent."  DeJesus Br. at 43. 
         We hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion in 
concluding that the 
probative value of the photo outweighed the potential unfair prejudice.  A 
trial judge could 
reasonably conclude that a jury was well capable of assessing the 
likelihood that the six-year- 
old photo accurately depicted DeJesus's appearance at the time of the 
shooting. 
 
                                X. 
         Finally, DeJesus argues that the cumulative effect of errors 
allegedly committed 
at trial require a new trial.  United States v. Williams, 739 F.2d 297 
(7th Cir. 1984).  In light 
of our conclusion that the sole potential error before us was harmless, we 
reject this argument. 
 
                               XI. 
          For the reasons stated above, we affirm the judgment of the 
district court.   
____________________ 
